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How Do the Grits Taste Exam c. Bug Control Exam d. Ron Jirsa b. John Pelphrey c. Jim Harrick Jr. It might also help to know that his father, Jim Harrick Sr. Every student in the class received an A. Not long afterward, both Harricks were relieved of their coaching duties.

If it strikes you as disgraceful that Chicago schoolteachers and Uni- versity of Georgia professors will cheat—a teacher, after all, is meant to instill values along with the facts—then the thought of cheating among sumo wrestlers may also be deeply disturbing.

Indeed, sumo is said to be less about competition than about honor itself. It is true that sports and cheating go hand in hand. Olympic sprinters and weightlifters, cyclists in the Tour de France, football linemen and baseball sluggers: It is not only the participants who cheat. The man accused of orchestrating the vote swap, a reputed Russian mob boss named Alimzhan Tokhtakhounov, was also suspected of rigging beauty pag- eants in Moscow.

An athlete who gets caught cheating is generally condemned, but most fans at least appreciate his motive: The Chicago White Sox, who conspired with gamblers to throw the World Series and are therefore known forever as the Black Sox , re- tain a stench of iniquity among even casual baseball fans.

Otherwise, he could have had class; he could have been a contender. Could it?

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Once again, the data can tell the story. As with the Chicago school tests, the data set under consideration here is surpassingly large: The incentive scheme that rules sumo is intricate and extraordi- narily powerful. Each wrestler maintains a ranking that affects every slice of his life: The sixty-six highest-ranked wrestlers in Japan, comprising the makuuchi and juryo divisions, make up the sumo elite. A wrestler near the top of this elite pyramid may earn millions and is treated like royalty.

Low-ranked wrestlers must tend to their superiors, preparing their meals, cleaning their quarters, and even soaping up their hardest-to- reach body parts. So ranking is everything. If he has a losing record, his ranking falls. If it falls far enough, he is booted from the elite rank entirely.

The eighth victory in any tournament is therefore critical, the difference between promotion and demotion; it is roughly four times as valuable in the rankings as the typical victory. How might we measure the data to prove it? The right column shows how often the 7—7 wrestler actually did win.

This makes sense; their records in this tournament indicate that the 8—6 wrestler is slightly better. Wrestlers on the bubble also do astonish- ingly well against 9—5 opponents: But perhaps there are further clues in the data that prove collu- sion. Maybe he accepts a bribe which would obviously not be recorded in the data.

Or perhaps some other arrangement is made between the two wrestlers. Keep in mind that the pool of elite sumo wrestlers is extraordinarily tight-knit. Furthermore, each wrestler belongs to a stable that is typi- cally managed by a former sumo champion, so even the rival stables have close ties.

Wrestlers from the same stable do not wrestle one an- other. In this case, there is no great pressure on the in- dividual match. So you might expect the wrestlers who won their 7—7 matches in the previous tournament to do about as well as they had in earlier matches against these same opponents—that is, winning roughly 50 percent of the time. Eighty percent in one match and 40 percent in the next?


How do you make sense of that? The most logical explanation is that the wrestlers made a quid pro quo agreement: The collective records of the various sumo stables are similarly aberra- tional. No formal disciplinary action has ever been taken against a Japa- nese sumo wrestler for match rigging. People tend to get defensive when the integrity of their national sport is impugned. These occasional media storms offer one more chance to measure possible corruption in sumo.

Media scrutiny, after all, creates a powerful incentive: So what happens in such cases? No matter how the data are sliced, they inevitably suggest one thing: Several years ago, two former sumo wrestlers came forward with extensive allegations of match rigging—and more. The two men began to receive threatening phone calls; one of them told friends he was afraid he would be killed by the yakuza. But shortly before- hand, the two men died—hours apart, in the same hospital, of a sim- ilar respiratory ailment.

The police declared there had been no foul play but did not conduct an investigation. In matches between two supposedly corrupt wrestlers, the wrestler who was on the bubble won about 80 percent of the time.

In bubble matches against a sup- posedly clean opponent, meanwhile, the bubble wrestler was no more likely to win than his record would predict.

So if sumo wrestlers, schoolteachers, and day-care parents all cheat, are we to assume that mankind is innately and universally corrupt? And if so, how corrupt? The answer may lie in. Consider this story about a man named Paul Feldman.

Once upon a time, Feldman dreamed big dreams. With early training in agricultural economics, he wanted to tackle world hunger. Instead, he took a job in Washington, analyzing weapons expendi- tures for the U. This was in For the next twenty-odd years, he did further analytic work in Washington. Then he made it a habit. Every Friday, he would bring in some bagels, a serrated knife, and cream cheese.


In order to recoup his costs, he set out a cash basket and a sign with the suggested price. His collection rate was about 95 percent; he attributed the underpayment to oversight, not fraud. In , when his research institute fell under new management, Feldman took a look at his future and grimaced.

He decided to quit his job and sell bagels. It was an honor-system commerce scheme, and it worked. Within a few years, Feldman was delivering 8, bagels a week to companies and earning as much as he had ever made as a research analyst. He had thrown off the shackles of cubicle life and made himself happy. He had also—quite without meaning to—designed a beautiful eco- nomic experiment. From the beginning, Feldman kept rigorous data on his bagel business.

So by measuring the money collected against the bagels taken, he found it possible to tell, down to the penny, just how honest his customers were. Did they steal from him? If so, what were the characteristics of a company that stole versus a company that did not? Under what circumstances did people tend to steal more, or less? Yes, shorting the bagel man is white-collar crime, writ how- ever small.

It might seem ludicrous to address as large and intractable a problem as white-collar crime through the life of a bagel man. But often a small and simple question can help chisel away at the biggest problems. Despite all the attention paid to rogue companies like Enron, aca- demics know very little about the practicalities of white-collar crime. The reason? There are no good data. A key fact of white-collar crime is that we hear about only the very slim fraction of people who are caught cheating.

Most embezzlers lead quiet and theoretically happy lives; employees who steal company property are rarely detected.

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With street crime, meanwhile, that is not the case. A street crime has a victim, who typically reports the crime to the police, who generate data, which in turn generate thousands of ac- ademic papers by criminologists, sociologists, and economists. But white-collar crime presents no obvious victim. From whom, exactly, did the masters of Enron steal? It did present a victim.

The victim was Paul Feldman. Not only that, but those bagel eaters knew the provider and had feelings presumably good ones about him. A broad swath of psychological and economic research has shown that people will pay different amounts for the same item depending on who is providing it. In the real world, Feldman learned to settle for less than 95 per- cent.

The cost of bagels has gone up dramatically since the beginning of the year. In the beginning, Feldman left behind an open basket for the cash, but too often the money vanished. Then he tried a coffee can with a money slot in its plastic lid, which also proved too tempting. In the end, he resorted to making small plywood boxes with a slot cut into the top.

The wooden box has worked well. Each year he drops off about seven thousand boxes and loses, on average, just one to theft. This is an intriguing statistic: So what do the bagel data have to say? In recent years, there have been two noteworthy trends in the overall payment rate. By the summer of , the overall rate had slipped to about 87 percent. Or it may have represented a more general surge in empathy. This may seem counterintuitive. There is far less street crime per capita in rural areas than in cities, in large part be- cause a rural criminal is more likely to be known and therefore caught.

Also, a smaller community tends to exert greater social in- centives against crime, the main one being shame. Weather, for instance, is a major factor. Unseasonably pleasant weather inspires people to pay at a higher rate. Worst are the holidays. There are, however, several good holidays: The difference in the two sets of holidays? The low-cheating holidays represent little more than an extra day off from work. Feldman has also reached some of his own conclusions about hon- esty, based more on his experience than the data.

Feldman wondered if perhaps the executives cheated out of an overdeveloped sense of entitlement. Yes, a lot of people steal from him, but the vast majority, even though no one is watching over them, do not.

But it would not have surprised Adam Smith.

A student named Glaucon offered the story in response to a lesson by Socrates— who, like Adam Smith, argued that people are generally good even without enforcement. He told of a shepherd named Gyges who stumbled upon a se- cret cavern with a corpse inside that wore a ring.

When Gyges put on the ring, he found that it made him invisible. Glaucon seemed to think the answer was no. But Paul Feldman sides with Socrates and Adam Smith—for he knows that the answer, at least 87 percent of the time, is yes. As institutions go, the Ku Klux Klan has had a markedly up-and- down history. It was founded in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War by six former Confederate soldiers in Pulaski, Tennessee. The six young men, four of whom were budding lawyers, saw themselves as merely a circle of like-minded friends.

But soon the Klan evolved into a multistate terrorist organization designed to frighten and kill emancipated slaves. In , President Ulysses S. But within barely a decade, the Klan had been extinguished, largely by legal and military interventions out of Washington, D.

If the Klan itself was defeated, however, its aims had largely been achieved through the establishment of Jim Crow laws. Congress, which during Reconstruction had been quick to enact measures of legal, social, and economic freedom for blacks, just as quickly began to roll them back.

The federal government agreed to withdraw its oc- cupation troops from the South, allowing the restoration of white rule.

In Plessy v. Ferguson, the U.

Supreme Court gave the go-ahead to full-scale racial segregation. The Ku Klux Klan lay largely dormant until , when D. By the s, a revived Klan claimed eight million members.

Public sentiment turned against the Klan as the unity of a country at war trumped its message of separatism. But within a few years, there were already signs of a massive revival. Stetson, founder of the famed hat company and the man for whom Stetson University was named. His uncle Brady was a Klansman. What drove Kennedy was a hatred of small-mindedness, igno- rance, obstructionism, and intimidation—which, in his view, were displayed by no organization more proudly than the Ku Klux Klan.

Kennedy saw the Klan as the terrorist arm of the white establishment itself. This struck him as an intractable problem, for a variety of rea- sons.

The Klan was in cahoots with political, business, and law- enforcement leaders. The public was frightened and felt powerless to act against the Klan. And the few anti-hate groups that existed at the time had little leverage or even information about the Klan.

He would spend years interviewing Klan leaders and sympathizers, sometimes taking ad- vantage of his own background and lineage to pretend that he was on their side of the issues.

Brown divulged what he was learning at the weekly Klan meetings: It was Klan custom, for instance, to append a Kl to many words.

Thus would two Klansmen hold a Klon- versation in the local Klavern.

But as it happened, a central tenet of life in the Klan—and of ter- rorism in general—is that most of the threatened violence never goes beyond the threat stage.

Here, compiled by the Tuskegee Institute, are the decade-by-decade statis- tics on the lynching of blacks in the United States: The statistics reveal at least three noteworthy facts. The second is the absence of a correlation between lynchings and Klan membership: Third, relative to the size of the black population, lynchings were exceedingly rare. To be sure, one lynching is one too many. But by the turn of the century, lynchings were hardly the everyday occurrence that they are often considered in the public recollection.

Compare the victims of lynchings in the s to the number of black infants who were dying at that time as a result of malnutrition, pneumonia, diarrhea, and the like.

As of , about 13 out of every black children died in infancy, or roughly 20, children each year—com- pared to 28 people who were lynched in a year. As late as , about 10, black infants died each year. The most compelling explanation is that all those early lynchings worked. White racists—whether or not they belonged to the Ku Klux Klan—had through their actions and their rhetoric developed a strong incentive scheme that was terribly clear and terribly frighten- ing.

If a black person violated the accepted code of behavior, whether by talking back to a bus driver or daring to try to vote, he knew he might well be punished, perhaps by death.

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But how will you deal with upsetting news? What if your privacy is compromised?

And are you prepared to have your DNA monetized? We speak with Anne Wojcicki, founder and C. The business woes of the U. One possible solution: Humans have been having kids forever, so why are modern parents so bewildered? The economist Emily Oster marshals the evidence on the most contentious topics — breastfeeding and sleep training, vaccines and screen time — and tells her fellow parents to calm the heck down.Convite para batizado.

John Brooks. Comunicao de Devoluo de Duplicata. Could it? He tracked down J. After all, anyone selling a home can now get online and gather her own information about sales trends and hous- ing inventory and mortgage rates. All the money you guys stole from those poor grandmas in California?

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